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CHAPTER ONE: Focus of the Investigation 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Natural resources such as copper, oil, gold, diamonds and manage historically play a dynamic 
role in many countries’ development and growth, as they provide employment, generate tax 
revenues and earn foreign exchange. The impact of mining sectors on economic development in 
these countries cannot be overemphasized, as they create employment opportunities for 
individuals on the domestic, sub-regional and international levels (i.e. direct or indirect 
employment, e.g. mining suppliers, contractors, international consultants, engineers etc.), and 
transfers modern technology and skills, thus altering the structure of their economies and 
providing the basis and potential for “sustainable growth.” 
Copper is one resource which has the potential to build a nation’s economy through the injection 
of enormous levels of foreign investment and the transfer of advanced technology and skills. One 
of world’s largest sources of copper ore is found Zambia. Following the first commercial mine, 
which was opened in 1928 at Roan Antelope (now Luanshya), copper mining has dominated 
Zambia’s economy, with Zambia being the second largest producer of copper in Africa following 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).1 
Copper mining in Zambia accounts for about three quarters of the nation’s export earnings,2 16% 
of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) and roughly 20% of the overall formal 
                                                          
1 Https://www.facebook.com/AfricanBusinessMagazine." DRC Now Africa's Biggest Copper Producer - African Business 
Magazine." African Business Magazine. 2015. Accessed December 06, 2016. 
http://africanbusinessmagazine.com/sectors/commodities/drc-now-africas-biggest-copper-producer/.  
2 Abi, D. (2007), Undermining Development? Copper Mining in Zambia, A joint Report by ACTS, Christian Aid and Scotland 
Agency 
2 
employment.3 The mining industry as a whole was reported in the Government’s 2015 Economic 
Report to have contributed $5,457.1M US dollars (74.7 percent) of the entire export earnings of 
$7,305.71160 million in 2015. Of this amount, $5,304. 3M US dollars originated from the 
auctions of copper and cobalt only. 
Although the immense contribution of mining toward economic growth and public finance, 
copper mining in Zambia has also produced enormous negative social-environmental impacts, 
owing to historical legacies from mining. This reinforces the notion that mineral wealth does not 
in the long term sustain and increase a nation’s economy in a manner that provides equitable 
development; indeed, in many cases, it hinders inclusive development and is responsible for 
environmental degradation and persistent poverty, sometimes leading to social unrest and 
conflict. For example, Zimbabwe has enjoyed huge diamond and gold revenues from as far back 
as the late 1960s; nevertheless, its per capita GDP is currently among the lowest in the world.  
Copper mining remains the backbone of Zambia’s economic sector. Yet inadequate resources 
and training, and the adoption of cheap but potentially dangerous approaches to extraction and 
processing of minerals, has created significant dangers for both local communities and the 
environment at large. Such a situation has been and is being experienced in most of Zambia’s 
copper mining districts. It is important to measure the scale of these social and environmental 
problems and to advance practical methods to deal with them. For example, the Consolidated 
Environmental Management Plan (CEMP) assessed the impact of copper mining on the Zambian 
Copper Belt Province and determined that most of the mining townships had significant levels of 
                                                          
3 “Analysis on Copper Mining Trends in Zambia-ZCCM Investments Holdings Plc." ZCCM Investments Holdings Plc. 2016. 
Accessed December 06, 2016. http://www.zccm-ih.com.zm/analysis-copper-mining-trends-zambia/ 
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contamination of copper and cobalt elements, resulting in acid drainage and metal absorption in 
the province’s streams and rivers.4 
Moreover, chemical spillage and leakages into the main water bodies in the rural areas 
surrounding the mining townships has created a serious food security threat, as farmers are 
unable to safely irrigate their crops or water their animals, and the food produced on the 
contaminated land endangers biodiversity, the health of both human and animal life, and affects 
residents’ economic livelihood.5 Frequent leakage of contaminants around rivers has forced 
many native settlers to abandon their ancestral lands and relocate to safer places.6 This was the 
case in the village of Shimulala in Chingola town, where the mining giant Vedanta’s subsidiary 
company KCM spilled toxic waste into the Mushishima stream, turning the water into a river of 
acid. In 2010, KCM drilled a borehole to provide clean water for the village, but a leaked 
document shows that the water from the borehole is also contaminated.7 
These undesirable ecological and social issues which are intrinsically linked with mining have 
serious implications for the economic growth and development of the nation. In Zambia, there 
are approximately 10 functioning copper mines, with 17 international companies and over 87 
local contractors. Several of these companies have come into operation by way of mergers, thus 
multiplying the scale of their actions into other provinces in the country, namely North-western, 
                                                          
4 SGAB, SWECO, THOMRO and UNZA. (2005). Preparation of Phase 2 of a Consolidated Environmental Management Plan – 
Project Summary Report. ZCCM Investments Holdings, Copper belt Environment Project. 
5 Ibid. 
5 Vidal, John. "'I Drank the Water and Ate the Fish. We All Did. The Acid Has Damaged Me Permanently'" The Observer. 2015. 
Accessed December 07, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/aug/01/zambia-vedanta-pollution-
village-copper-mine.  
5 "Chamber of Mines of Zambia » Production Figures." Chamber of Mines of Zambia. Accessed December 07, 2016. 
http://mines.org.zm/production-figures/.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Vidal, John. "'I Drank the Water and Ate the Fish. We All Did. The Acid Has Damaged Me Permanently'" The Observer. 2015. 
Accessed December 07, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/aug/01/zambia-vedanta-pollution-
village-copper-mine.  
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Eastern, Southern and Central Provinces.8 The activities of these companies have also affected 
local livelihoods and environmental conservation efforts. 
This thesis explores the impact of large scale copper mining on the environment and the 
distribution of its benefits. This will be achieved using the Copper Belt Province as a case study. 
The Copper Belt Province of Zambia is one of the nation’s largest copper ore producing 
provinces, with six active copper mines dating as far back as 1928.9 This study will use a 
political ecological framework to show that Zambia’s mineral resource wealth has produced a 
sequence of economic and political realignments arising from the operations of the copper 
mining industry that has subsequently negatively impacted the local environment and the 
communities who live in, and depend upon it. 
1.2 Formulation and Background Context 
The Republic of Zambia is endowed with many minerals such uranium, gold, emeralds, zinc, 
coal, cobalt and amethyst, to name but a few.10 Nevertheless, the nation is principally reliant on 
the large-scale extraction of copper for its export earnings, tax revenue and direct and indirect 
employment opportunities. Commercial copper mining in Zambia started in the late 1920s; thus, 
the country has a long history of copper mining activities. At independence in October 1964, 
Zambia’s Gross National Product per capita was one of the highest on the continent, mainly due 
                                                          
8 "Chamber of Mines of Zambia » Production Figures." Chamber of Mines of Zambia. Accessed December 07, 2016. 
http://mines.org.zm/production-figures/.   
9 Ibid. 
10 “Sustainable Development in Zambia: Experiences and Ways Forward,” 
http://www.ias.unu.edu/sub_page.aspx?catID=107&ddlID=207. Accessed. 9/7/2016 
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to the copper mining industry, which in 1960 accounted for 90% of its total export earnings11 and 
contributed 16% of wage employment.12 
Unfortunately, the nation’s reliance on copper has made her a mono-economy, primarily 
dependent on the export of one major natural resource to generate government revenue and earn 
foreign exchange.13 In an increasingly global economy and marketplace, mining companies are 
not limited to domestic markets; rather, they are constantly searching for future potential markets 
to boost their revenues. This globalization of the mining industry affects copper production in 
Zambia owing to its reliance on foreign direct investment, technological transfer, and enhanced 
trade opportunities beyond domestic borders.14 
Multinational corporations (MNC) play a huge role in Zambia’s mining industry, because they 
operate on a global scale with major activities and strategies centrally determined by their boards 
in developed countries. Multinational corporations such as the Anglo-Swiss company Glencore, 
First Quantum Minerals Ltd of Canada and the London-based Indian founded mining company 
of Vedanta Resources plc are able to mobilise capital investment resources which often far 
exceed the annual GDP of emerging nations like Malawi, Lesotho and Zambia. As the academic 
scholar Todaro15 has observed, “Their capital security gain has permitted MNCs to increase their 
economic and political strength in emerging nations through product market supremacy, thus 
conferring upon them the ability to manipulate prices and incomes and to conspire with other 
firms in limiting access by other potential players.”16 In the case of Zambia, the influence of 
                                                          
11 Osei-Hwedie, Z, B. Development Policy and Economic Change in Zambia: A Re-Assessment, 2003 
12 Daniel, Philip. Africanization, Nationalization and Inequality: Mining Labor and the Copper Belt in Zambian Development. 
Cambridge University Press, London, 1979. 
13 Osei-Hwedie, Z, B. Development Policy and Economic Change in Zambia: A Re-Assessment, 2003 
14 Ibid. 
15 Todaro, M. (1985), Economic Development in the Third World, New York, pp 50-180 
16 Ibid. 
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these mega-sized MNCs cannot be overstated. The mismanagement of Zambia’s copper 
resources by the State-owned Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) ltd. in the 1970s and 
80s was one of the key factors leading to over nearly two decades of neo-liberal economic 
policies and strategies from the early late 1990s that saw private industry-led growth as the main 
path towards recovery from the economic crisis arising from the socialist economic policies of 
the one-party state that came to an end in 1991. Zambia, like many other nations that 
implemented structural adjustment program (SAP) reforms from the latter part of the 20th 
century, was forced to privatize industries such as mining by selling the state-owned copper 
mines. The Zambian government implemented policies and enacted legislation aimed at 
enhancing private foreign direct investment in the mining industry, and multinational 
corporations were awarded concessions and obtained mining licenses for huge portions of land, 
rich in natural ores for exploration and extraction.  
Despite enormous investments in the mining sector after the privatization of the mines, the 
benefits accruing to the majority in the nation are scarcely noticeable. The claims of inclusive 
growth for which the government sold the mines are farfetched with the benefits largely reaped 
by the shareholders and executives of the MNCs and a small local elite. Although Zambia is 
today classified as a middle-income country,17 on many measures it is paradoxically one of the 
poorest nations in the world, with 79.6 % of the population living below the income poverty line 
of US $1.25 per day.18 There have in recent times since privatization, been periods of relative 
economic development; but this has been far from inclusive development  and current mining 
operations have impacted negatively upon the natural environment and livelihoods that depend 
                                                          
17 UNDP (2011) ‘Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All’ Explanatory note on 2011 Human Development Report 
composite indices 
18 Ibid. 
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upon it. Part of the reason for increased ecological degradation in the nation relates to procedures 
used by the government when granting mining licences and concessions in Zambia. There has 
been little to no consultation with the public, local communities or other interested stakeholders 
on matters pertaining to “proposals, purchases, environment management and mining rights, the 
result being no local informed input on the potential of mining exploration developments will 
influence upon the environment.”19 
Currently, major shareholders in the Zambian mines industry include Mopani Copper Mines Plc., 
owned by Carissa Investments (jointly Glencore and First Quantum of Canada; the latter 
invested $3 billion dollars into the former ZCCM holdings);20 Kokoda Copper Mines, a 
subsidiary of Vendata Plc., which invested $8 billion dollars into the mines; J&W of 
Switzerland, which also owns Chambeshi Metals Plc., with Chibuluma Copper Mines subsidiary 
owned through the South African giant firm Metorex, which invested a sum of $406 million 
dollars in the mines.21 
The overdependence on copper by Zambia has been made more serious by the nation being a 
“price taker” on the London Metal Exchange. Copper produced by the nation is sold on 
international trade platforms such as the London Metal Exchange (LME), which sets the copper 
price per global supply and demand conditions. As investor perceptions about these conditions 
can change rapidly, the LME’s copper price is infamous for its limited period instability. In just 
the first two weeks of November 2016, the price has spiked by over 20% to in excess of US 
                                                          
19 Garvin, T., Mcgee, T.K., Smoyer, Tomic, K. E. and Aubynn, E.A. (2009) “Community-company relations in gold mining in 
Ghana,” Journal of Environmental Management, Vol. 90: 571-586  
20 World Investment Report 2007. Accessed December 08, 2016. 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=724 
21 Ibid. 
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$5,600 a ton, from about $1000 less a month earlier.22 The outcome of this price instability is 
unpredictability and volatility in Zambia’s foreign exchange earnings and government tax 
revenue from copper.  
As the Zambian copper mining sector is inextricably linked to the global capitalist system, it is 
inevitably exposed to the manner in which this system operates. Its predominant motivation is 
the maximization of returns to shareholders, often achieved by “price taking” companies like 
mining companies by the minimization of costs. Thus, for example, wage levels for local miners 
are kept as low as possible. Further, particularly pertinent in the context of this paper, when a 
conflict arises between minimizing costs and enhancing environmental safeguards through costly 
adjustments to processes and installations, the natural tendency of a capitalist firm is to cut 
corners to protect the bottom line. This is even more likely in the case of the modern MNC 
where the line between corporate management and the shareholders has become very blurred. 
Thus, the CEO of Glencore since 2002 has been Ivan Glasenburg. He has benefitted enormously 
from his large holdings of Glencore stock. In this context, the operational decisions taken by 
such a stock holding CEO and his directors are even more likely to put the maximization of 
returns to shareholders above any costly investments in environmental protection measures. 
Indeed, they are only likely to do so if required and effectively compelled to by the Governments 
in whose countries their mines and smelters operate.   
1.3 Research Objectives 
The study seeks to explore the impact that copper mining in Zambia has made on the 
environment by enriching or just preserving and conserving it on the one hand or rather 
                                                          
22 "Copper Price Rises." Zambia Daily Mail Copper Price Rises Comments. Accessed December 08, 2016. https://www.daily-
mail.co.zm/?p=72823 .  
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impoverishing and degrading it on the other. To do this, the study will consider the following 
specific objectives. 
1. To investigate how mining operations in the Copper Belt Province have impacted local 
social and environmental conditions. 
2. To assess the financial gains from copper mining and how the revenue from copper 
mining is distributed among the various interested parties, stakeholders and recognized 
participants. 
3. To comprehend and critically examine the policy framework established to foster 
environmentally sustainable extraction of copper in Zambia, and make recommendations 
that will strengthen this framework for the future promotion of an environmentally 
sustainable copper mining industry. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
To achieve the above objectives, the following major research questions were posed: 
1. What are the political and economic factors influencing the scale, scope and distribution 
of the benefits accruing from copper mining in Zambia? 
2. What are the types and distribution of environmental impacts associated with copper 
mining in Zambia? 
3. What kind of environmental conservation and preservation policies and strategies have 
emerged to mitigate the environmental impact of copper mining in Zambia? 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
Copper is a commodity utilized in a wide range of sectors due to its chemical and physical 
properties. This study was undertaken to produce data on the influence that mining activities 
10 
have on the environment and local communities in Zambia. In explaining the effects of 
environmental degradation, the study results can potentially be used by various stakeholders 
including the government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the church and the private 
sector as well other international partners, to amend economic-environmental practices 
pertaining to mitigating water contamination and soil and air pollution.  
Given that the Zambian government has ratified various international agreements and 
declarations such as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s) - which include 
SDG number 3 (“Good health and Wellbeing”), SDG number 6 (“Clean Water and Sanitation”) 
and SDG number 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities) - , this research study would avail the 
Government of Zambia with the opportunity to implement these declarations domestically by 
working hand in hand with mining companies to develop environmentally sustainable strategies. 
The information gathered would furthermore support interventions by various government 
ministries and agencies (i.e. Ministry of Community Development as well as the Ministry of 
Mines and Minerals Development). The research may also contribute to the existing knowledge 
of mining activities and their impact on the environment, by aiding other academicians and 
researchers to build on the existing literature to strengthen social and civic policy appraisal and 
execution modalities. Communities at the local level must demand improved social corporate 
responsibility, and grassroots advocacy may empower them to apply the existing study results in 
demanding dialogue and participatory decision making on aspects related to mining in Zambia, 
especially as it relate to the distribution of benefits and the efforts to mitigate all negative 
environmental footprints of mining. 
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1.6 Limitations of the Study 
This research had several restrictions. First, the study is constrained in scope as it is concentrated 
on one study area—the Zambian Copper Belt Province; therefore, it offers restrictions for 
broader scale generalization. In addition, it does not incorporate the successes and generally 
albeit inequitable economic effects of the mining industry, but instead studies the influence of 
copper mining on the environment and how the environment and local communities have been 
negatively impacted because of copper mining activities. 
Second, a major limitation of the work related to the researcher’s inability to travel to the study 
site (the Copper Belt Province, Zambia) owing to financial and immigration restrictions. This in 
turn impacted the overall direction of the study, as the researcher had to rely upon existing 
research conducted and published by other scholars, limiting his investigative inquiry (especially 
in gathering information from key informants and other participants through in-depth 
interviews). However, with perseverance, the research was conducted. A third limitation was the 
difficulty of gathering literature reviews within a restricted time frame; this in turn had 
inferences for the theoretical depth of the investigation. 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis  
The study consists of five chapters. This first chapter presents the introduction of the study by 
covering the contextual background of the issue under investigation, addresses the statement of 
the problem, research objectives and questions and furthermore provides the justification for, and 
limitations of, the investigation. The second chapter reviews Political Ecology’s origins and 
development; it also highlights the significance of the conceptual framework adopted for this 
study, by linking the study to the debate. The chapter then discusses methods and data collection 
tools used for the case study site. Chapter three begins by outlining both the political and 
12 
economic background of Zambia, and how these two aspects have influenced copper mining 
production in the nation. Chapter four covers an overview of environmental assessment of 
Copper Mining by setting out a thorough description of copper production processes, debates the 
actors and policies involved in environmental protection, before, discussing specific pollutants 
that originate from the Zambian copper mines and smelters. Finally, chapter five deliberates on 
the findings, implications and makes appropriate conclusions and recommendations.     
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CHAPTER TWO: Research Framework 
 
2.1 Political Ecology: Origins and Development 
This study will use a political ecology framework to analyze the environmental impact of copper 
mining in Zambia, from considerations of power (policy and practice) to how the environment 
and communities have changed at local level. It shows how the distribution of power (which is 
the main subject of political science) determines the use of the natural environment between 
different categories and groups of humans and with regard to other species.23  
The development of political ecology as a field of study and as an analytical framework arose in 
response to the need to analyze the dynamics of change in human ecosystems, emerging first as a 
subsidiary field of geography in the mid-late 1960s. The discussion of issues covered in political 
ecology grew out of a very large number of disjointed works from several disciplines, including 
geography, sociology, anthropology, biology, and ecology.24 The application of a political 
ecology perspective has been instrumental in assisting scholars to comprehend how and why the 
costs and beneﬁts related to changes in ecology and the environment that arise from human 
activity are unevenly dispersed among humans according to the economic and political power 
they are able to exercise.25 The field has greatly expanded to include discussions on a wide range 
of environmental problems such as loss of topsoil, disposal of nuclear waste, global population 
                                                          
23 Robbins P. Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction .2nd ed. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd; 2012, 296. 
24 Brown, J. Christopher, and Mark Purcell. "There’s nothing inherent about scale: Political ecology, the local trap, and the 
politics of development in the Brazilian Amazon." Geoforum 36, no. 5 (2005): 607-624. 
25 Ibid. 
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growth, global warming, ozone depletion, depletion of global fisheries, species extinction, 
desertification, environmentally-related illness, acid rain, and decline in air and water quality.26 
One approach to political ecology joins human ecology (largely, the study of human social 
existence and habitat) with a social and political examination, i.e. how distinct groups of  players 
at diverse scales challenge the rights of other players to revenues and other benefits from an 
economic activity that uses natural resources in a predominantly ecological setting.27 The 
overriding necessity for access and control over land, space and ecological resources, 28 suggests 
that power relationships are key to the political ecology method—specifically, the central 
attention it gives to its political analysis regarding the insatiable need for humans to use natural 
resources.29 An examination of “scale” (physical, financial, information, political, social) in 
political ecology deepens an understanding of the  resource curse30, which is the failure of many 
resource-rich nations to benefit significantly, sustainably and equitably from their natural 
resource capital, and for their governments to respond effectively  to the public welfare and 
economic empowerment requirements of their citizens. Thus, for example, because of poor 
public administration and governance in many developing countries and unfair trade practices 
between unevenly balanced nations in a globalised capitalist world, the MNCs from rich nations 
can extract concessions such as tax breaks for their mining activities, reducing the public finance 
benefits of being a natural resource rich country. There are very few African nations that have 
                                                          
26 Https://loyno.academia.edu/JohnClark. "Dialectical Political Ecology" Academia.edu-Share Research. Accessed December 09, 
2016. https://www.academia.edu/2937823/_Dialectical_Political_Ecology.  
27 Brosius JP. Comments to A. Escob-after nature: steps to an anti-essentialist political ecology. Cur Anthropol 1999, 40:16-17. 
28 Tan-Mullins, M. 2007, "The State and its Agencies in Coastal Resources Management: the political ecology of fisheries 
management in Pattani, Southern Thailand", Singapore Journal of Tropical Ecology, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 898-918. 
29 Swyngedouw, E. 2007, "Techno-natural Revolutions: the scalar politics of Franc's hydro-social dream for Spain, 1939-75", 
Transactions of the British Institute of British Geographers NS, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 9-28. 
30 Neumann, R. 2009, "Political Ecology: Theorizing Scale", Progress in Human Geography, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 398-406. 
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gained sustainable and equitable development from their possession and exploitation of their 
mineral resources.31 
The scholarship on mining raises huge concerns in attempting to comprehend environmental and 
individual livelihood sustainability. It is evident that the political ecology of mining has a 
combined appeal where biophysical and social/political conditions are intimately entangled. 
From this standpoint, it can be seen that the mining industry in emerging countries operated 
overwhelmingly and disproportionately in the direction of those who have power through their 
control over huge capital resources. 
Power is said to be “the capacity of a performer to regulate their own synergy with the 
environment and the cooperation of other performers with the environment.”32 Power may be 
derived from the State, individuals and organisations alike. The exercise of power inevitably 
results in an uneven relationship between different groups and performers and, as a consequence, 
affects environmental outcomes. The exercise of power invariably favours the specific interests 
of those with power over other less powerful players, so dominating their legitimate interests in 
preserving and using ecological resources to advance their own interests. In the case of mining, 
land ownership and control in areas rich in mineral resources is invariably directed toward 
conferring commercial mining rights to powerful MNCs over enabling local smallholder farmers 
to continue to have access to that land for the raising of crops and animals. This result is 
manifested when the powerful party’s control of the ecological and natural resources is 
consolidated through regulation and intervention by the State to prioritize their activities over 
those of less powerful groups. Thus, these vulnerable groups are side-lined in policy formulation 
                                                          
31 Molle, F. 2007, "Scale and Power in River Basin Management: the Chayo Phraya River in Thailand," The Geographical Journal, 
vol. 173, no. 4, pp. 731-753. 
32 Bryant, R. L. and Bailey, S. (1997) Third World Political Ecology, Routledge Publications, London. P 39 
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and implementation and indeed are often abandoned, usually facing the future with increased 
difficulty as their source of livelihood is no longer available to them.33  
In the case of Zambian copper mining, as in many other emerging nations where natural 
resources are extracted, the “resource curse” is apparent. The “resource curse” postulates that 
possession of mineral resources does not always lead to sustainable and equitable development 
for the majority of the citizens of a resource rich nation. Indeed, in most cases they have turned 
out to be curses rather than blessings in that they breed corruption and rent-seeking behaviour by 
state officials, delay the adoption of more broad-based development strategies that can produce 
equitable economic growth and expose the nation to significant external shocks as a result of 
highly volatile commodity prices. There are so many influential and powerful players in resource 
rich countries - such as highly capitalised and profit maximising multinational mining companies 
(MNCs), the State and its rent-seeking officials and other local elites (e.g. traditional leaders)  
who can be subverted into supporting the interests of the MNCs such that these MNCs take away 
a disproportionate share of the nation’s treasure.  The local people and their communities are left 
to cope with the negative effects of mining these resources, including alienation from the 
benefits they traditionally received from the land, leading to greater material hardship and 
insecurity and a life lived in a degraded natural environment.  In some cases, like that of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and previously in Angola with the UNITA rebels, 
conflict over their resources (diamonds) lead to political and social unrest and conflicts and the 
loss of life for many hundreds of thousands of people.34. These battles originated from disputes 
over income streams, scuffles over area dominance, inequitable access to ecological resources, 
                                                          
33 Ibid. 40 
34 Bebbington, A., Hinojosa, L., Bebbington, H.D., Burneo, M.L. and Ximena, W. (2008) “Contention and Ambiguity: Mining and 
the Possibilities of Development,” Development and Change, Vol. 39, No. 6: 887-914. Blackwell Publishing 
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failure to protect human and citizen rights and disapproval of individuals and groups over the 
distribution  of mineral rentals.35 
Political ecology, like many other philosophical concepts and analytical frameworks, has not 
advanced far without having its own challenges and detractors within academic circles, largely 
emanating from the high level of ambiguity that exists when it comes to defining and classifying 
what political ecology is and what it means. Some scholars have argued that it is simply a study 
plan;36 awkwardly enough, others have called it a method.37 Some address it as a standpoint,38 
with others calling it a training method.39  
2.2 Conceptual Framework 
The broader political economy has been further explained in terms of political ecology by Piers 
Blaikie in The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing Countries.40 This work both 
elaborates the political discussion of soil erosion’s causes and impacts and recognizes the diverse 
social contexts in which soil erosion is considered problematic.41 Blaikie’s work uses chains of 
explanation at multiple scales; it acknowledges various root causes of degradation, and examines 
the social and institutional impacts on environmental knowledge itself.42  
This framework sheds light on pertinent issues associated with mining, for example, the effect of 
local inequalities on land use and land degradation such as reduced access to land ownership due 
to over population, increased pressure from other industrial sectors in need of land (i.e. 
                                                          
35 Ibid. 
36 Bryant, R. L. (1998), “Power, Knowledge and Political Ecology in the Third World: A Review,” Progress in Physical Geography, 
22, (1), 79-84 
37 Zimmerer, K. S. & Bassett, T. J. (2003), Political Ecology: An Integrative Approach to Geography and Environment 
Development Studies, The Guilford Press, New York, 311pp 
38 Neumann, R. P. (2005), “Making Political Ecology,” Hodder Arnold, Human Geography in the Making, London, 213pp 
39 Blaikie, P. (2011), “Should Some Political Ecology Be Useful?” The Inaugural Lecture for the Cultural and Political Ecology 
Specialty Group, Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, April 2010 (in press), Geoforum 
40 Blaikie, P. and Brookfield, H. 1987, Land Degradation and Society, Methuen, London. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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commercial agriculture, cattle rearing and urban growth development). Multiple scales of 
analysis provide different types of information on societal and environmental processes that 
operate at different scales, thus a multi-scale approach is necessary to fully understand trends and 
their causes. Blaikie applied the multi-scale approach to the case of Luangwa National Park, in 
Eastern Zambia, using land-based research methods (See Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Blaikie & Brookfield’s Multi-Scale Approach Framework (Blaikie 1995: 2008) 
 
2.3 Linkage to Study 
This research focuses on the effects of copper mining on local communities and on the 
environment in the Copper Belt Province of Zambia. The use of both a political ecology 
framework and the concept of multiple scale analysis will provide a better comprehension of 
how copper mining operations influence environmental outcomes in the local countryside and 
communities, keeping in mind their interaction with power dynamics as they operate at different 
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levels. Both the theory and concept of political ecology will be useful in understanding how 
environmental strategies are carved out. 
2.4 Methods and Data Collection 
The study involved the collection of secondary data in an effort find answers to the paper’s 
research questions. The secondary data used has been critically assessed to validate the 
credibility and reliability of key official documents, publications, reports and various internet 
sourced articles. The paper focuses on a case study of the Copper Belt Province of Zambia, 
examining the impact of large scale copper mining on the environment and surrounding 
communities, as well as observing the environmental policies put in place to curtail negative 
social and environment effects. 
2.5 Research Methods 
Qualitative methods have a descriptive capability based on primary and unstructured data,43 and 
are an effective method for studies of a liberal nature such as sociology. Gunnarson44 contends 
that the advantage of applying a qualitative technique in research is that it takes into 
consideration the overall picture, objectively observing variables in their natural habitats. A 
primarily qualitative approach was therefore selected over a more quantitative method as the 
proper approach to guide this research, focusing on how copper mining in Zambia is either 
empowering or impoverishing the environment and the people in it. 
 
2.6 Relevant Literature 
                                                          
43 Ghauri, P., Grønhaug, K. and Kristianslund, I. (1995). Research Methods in Business Studies: A Practical Study, New York: 
Prentice Hall 
44 Gunnarsson, R. (2002). ”Research Methods, Validity and Reliability,” online: http://infovoice.se/fou/, (Retrieved 04-03-2010) 
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Project-related documents such as relevant Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA), reports 
from the Copper Belt Environment Project (CEP),45 the Government of Zambia’s Consolidated 
Environmental Management Plan (CEMP) and its related Legislative Action Plan and Social 
Impact Assessment Report (ESIA) were also used as references. Other Government progress 
reports, reports of non-government organizations and other academic articles on the mining 
sector were also referred to. 
2.7 Case Study Methods 
Bryman and Bell46 (2007) state that a case study methodology comprises a thorough and 
demanding examination of one or more cases, critically analyzing the extent of the case. The use 
of case studies cuts across a variety of academic fields and disciplines such as in anthropology, 
ethnography, geography, politics, philosophy and scientific research. Nevertheless, there are 
limitations when it comes to using a case study design. Given that one case scenario does not fit 
all other cases, it may create bias towards showcasing a certain group or situation. However, the 
drive for use of this technique is not to oversimplify the results of other cases or larger 
communities;47 rather, it is intended draw attention to those specific cases, examine their 
distinguishing settings and to generate an outline for dialogue on the issue. 
 
 
 
2.8 Choice of Copper Belt Province as Case Study 
                                                          
45 World Bank. 2012. Zambia - Copper Belt Environment Project (cep). Washington, DC: World Bank Group. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/759211474589929467/Zambia-Copperbelt-Environment-Project-cep 
accessed12/10/2016 
46 Bryman, A. and Bell, E. (2007). Business Research Methods, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
47 Ibid. 
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The “copper belt” runs through northern Zambia and southern Democratic Republic of Congo. In 
the 2010 census, the population of the Copper Belt Province of Zambia was 1,972,317.48 The 
urban population was 376,861; rural was 1,595,456.49 The Copper Belt Province is an ideal case-
study given the province’s large-scale mining activity, both currently and in colonial days. 
Mining has been identified as the chief source of most of the water, air and soil pollution in the 
province due to the extraction and processing of copper and cobalt ores. This provides a defined 
area in which to study the impact of mining on the environment and the local communities, and 
how environmental conservation efforts are being designed and implemented. Also, as a former 
long-term resident of Copper Belt Province, the researcher has first-hand experience of the 
mining industry’s impact on the environment and on local communities. 
Even though there are about six large scale mines in the province, there have not been enough 
impact studies undertaken despite the vast and long-standing environmental problems they have 
caused. This provided the author with an opening to investigate copper mining in the province in 
depth, and attempt to disentangle the sensitivities and uncertainties felt by those close to mining 
operations, as well as to contribute to the body of work with regard to mining in the Copper belt 
Province. 
                                                          
48 "2010 Census Final Population and Electoral Information." Accessed December 11, 2016. 
http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/report/Census/2010/Provincial/2010 Summary Census Wall Chart-Copper belt Province.pdf.  
49 Ibid.  
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Figure 2: Map of Zambia highlighting Copper Belt Province50 
 
Figure 3: Copper belt Province Mining Locations51 
                                                          
50 Map A highlights the geographical location of the Copperbelt Province on the Zambian map. 
http://www.touristlink.com/zambia/copperbelt/overview.  
51   Map. B shows the major Copperbelt mining towns, as geographically located on the map of Zambia. The map 
was accessed from https://www.csrm.uq.edu.au/events/smi-seminar-chinese-mining-in-africa-its-global-
controversy on 10/10/2016  
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 CHAPTER 3: Overview of the Political Economy in Zambia 
3.1 Introduction 
For over half a century after her independence from Great Britain, Zambia continues to 
encounter severe problems including persistently high poverty rates, poor land administration, 
inadequate public service delivery, high pollution levels in mining areas and inadequate capacity 
to manage her environmental and natural resources. This chapter presents a historical and 
contextual background of Zambia’s political economy with a description of the political and 
economic influences that have shaped the governance and administration of Zambia. 
 
Figure 4 Timeline: Political and Economic History of Zambia 
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3.2 The Political Economy of Zambia  
 In the early 1960s, Zambia was ranked as a middle-income country, with vast economic growth 
potential; presently, despite huge mineral resources, the country was ranked a low 139th in the 
world in terms of the Human Development Index of the United Nations in 2014.  Zambia is a 
land-locked country surrounded by seven neighboring countries: Angola, Botswana, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. 
Geographically positioned in central Southern Africa, it is 753,000 km2 (291,000 square miles) 
in size, a little larger than Texas. Farming potential is relatively high due to favorable climatic 
conditions and rainfall patterns. Nevertheless, like many other nations in the sub-Saharan region, 
Zambia’s economy remains heavily dependent on the mining sector and trade, and there is a 
relative neglect of other high potential sectors such as agriculture, tourism and agro-processing. 
Large scale copper mining has been the engine of development for the country since the 1920s, 
initially laying the foundation favorable for investment in industry and developing an 
industrialized society.52  
When mining exploration activities began under the administration of the British South African 
Corporation in 1921, the company invested massive capital resources into Zambia’s first 
commercial copper mines. However, prior to the mining operations, Zambia had remained 
scarcely populated, with the only commercial interest in the nation being access to slave labor. 
Slave traders exploited the area by selling slaves to rich southern groups in South Africa and 
Mashonaland (present-day Zimbabwe).53  
                                                          
52 The urban share of the population rose rapidly from 17 percent in 1960 to about 40 percent in 1980. For two decades this 
share has remained stable between 39 and 40 percent (World Bank, 2003). 
53 Holmes, T. 2004. “The History of Zambia.” The Zambian. Available at www.thezambian.com. 
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Following the discovery of large deposits of copper ore, white settlers started arriving in large 
numbers, with little or no initial supporting investment in infrastructure. Men from all corners of 
Zambia, who prior to the opening of the mines had mainly lived in rural areas, engaged in the 
barter system of trade (exchange of goods), and had a subsistence fishing and an agri-pastoral 
economic livelihood, started migrating to the mining areas to find work. Huge investments were 
poured into the copper mining sector, encouraging urbanization, with urban areas being the 
central economic wealth zones leaving the rural areas economically backward. Investment in 
rural Zambia was chiefly along the rail line between the Copper belt and southern provinces, and 
was merely for enhancing transportation networks to facilitate swift exportation of minerals to 
export markets in neighboring countries with access to seaports. 
This divide between rural and urban development persists today, strongly influenced by 
tribalism, mining and urban political power. It is a defining characteristic of Zambia’s economic 
growth path. Given her endowment of abundant lands and mineral wealth, and despite 
urbanization, a significant population still lives in rural areas, limiting their access to markets, 
public services and transportation.54 Even in urban areas, the majority of the people live in 
densely populated shanty compounds with inadequate housing and social amenities. Very little 
progress has been made when it comes to the equitable distribution of national resources, even 
though the nation has undergone several different forms of government administration and 
leadership.55 During the last three decades, Zambia has experienced five distinct policy 
regimes.56  
 
                                                          
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 World Bank. 2004. Zambia: Country Economic Memorandum. World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
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3.3 Zambia’s Unsuccessful Economic Interventions: 1965-1990 
Zambia’s first President, Kenneth Kaunda, initially embarked on an economic strategy that 
favoured the fortunes of private sector companies like the Anglo-American Corporation that 
were engaged in the mining sector in what was - in the first years after independence - 
fundamentally a market economy.57 Mining and urban towns were significantly favored over 
agriculture and the rural areas because of an import substitution policy funded by revenues from 
rising copper exports58. Thus, very few Zambians benefited from foreign investment in mining, 
specifically those that were located in rural areas, even at a time (1964-72) when the nation’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) increased at 5.1%59 (see Figure 5). The economic gap between the 
rich and the poor was widened, and increased in the decades that followed.60  
 
Figure 5. Real GDP and Population Growth, 1965-200161 
                                                          
57 World Bank. 1994. Zambia Poverty Assessment. World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
58 Ibid. 
59 McCulloch, N., Baulch, B., and Cherel-Robson, M. 2000. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s. Working 
Paper, Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex. 
60 The Gini coefficient was 0.48 in 1959 and 0.59 in 1974 (World Bank, 1994). 
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Under the Mulungushi Economic Reforms announced on 19th April 1968, the Zambian 
Government began to dismantle the market economy and the private sector owned mines 
themselves were nationalized in 1972 ending the period of market-driven economic policies. At 
the same time, the Constitution was changed and the country left multi-party democracy behind 
and embarked on a “One-party participatory democracy” – effectively a one-party State under 
Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP).    
The economic, financial and political power that came with being in control of the mining sector 
was enormous, especially because it generated a large proportion  of the nation’s foreign 
exchange and tax revenue. The mine workers were among the most well paid and politically 
active groups of employees in the country, given the role that the mining sector trade unions 
played in demanding improved worker conditions and increased wages, sometimes accompanied 
with threats of nationwide boycotts and strikes against the State. 
Inequality gaps between urban dwellers and rural dwellers, created when the copper mines were 
nationalized, was further increased by the newly-adopted socialist policies that the Kaunda 
administration implemented with the goal of supporting nationalized businesses including the 
mines. This switch in policy orientation from a market economy to a socialist economic stance 
coincided with the global recession of the early 1970s, triggered by the oil price increases 
engineered by the cartel of oil producing countries – OPEC. The recession hit the commodity 
markets, and global copper prices fell. As a result, Zambia’s foreign exchange earnings and tax 
revenues fell rapidly and government began to borrow heavily in an attempt to maintain its 
spending programmes. However, the fast development of the late 1960s ended. As the recession, 
prolonged throughout the 1970s, export incomes and tax revenues continued to dwindle and a 
serious fiscal crisis developed as the Kaunda administration became more and more indebted. 
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Unsure if the recession was momentary, they failed to make reasonable accommodations to 
address the matter, (e.g. limiting spending on its subsidies and holding back on salary increments 
for government workers). Instead, the government borrowed, unsustainably raising its foreign 
debt. 
Increased pressure was placed on the Kaunda administration as the growth in the nation’s GDP 
fell precipitously becoming negative in several years in the 1980s. For most of this decade, there 
was lack of real political will to make the necessary fiscal and economic adjustments and 
eventually meant that the government was forced to begin to implement “structural adjustment” 
policies by the two Bretton Woods Institutions i.e. the World Bank (WB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  
Until these policies were started, subsidies and consumer price controls protected most of the 
urban population from the effects of the recession. Further, a scheme of import licensing 
supported the mining industry, other nationalized industries and state owned ventures, in that 
they were favoured when it came to access to the country’s dwindling foreign exchange reserves. 
This meant that there was little practical encouragement to diversify and invest in other 
productive sectors, so despite all the economic policy intervention efforts, the economy 
staggered and remained indifferent to the strategies introduced.  
The first adjustment program with IMF backing was introduced in the early 1980s when the state 
began to admit policy failures. Immediately, a plan of action to stabilize the economy was 
implemented through a structural adjustment program (SAP). Stabilization was achieved to a 
certain extent through better macroeconomic steadiness, but unfortunately, the lack of 
enthusiasm from the government to see though all policy outcomes contributed to economic 
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decline.62 Because of the nation’s inability to implement the SAP and maintain economic 
stability, by the mid-1980s subsidies included 20% of the economic budget, whereas prices 
controls for the products of a wide number of nationalized businesses  made them uneconomic 
and in desperate need of cross-subsidization from the falling revenues from the mines.63 
Following the cancellation intervene reform agreements by Kaunda’s government in 1983, the 
government entered a second SAP aimed at reducing price controls and a general reduction of 
tariffs. The second SAP had a broader scope, recognizing the need to diversify and invest in 
other sectors including agriculture. Like earlier attempts, the success of the program was 
dependent on the support of the elite and urban dwellers. This led to civil unrest over food prices, 
and in urban towns in the Copper Belt Province, residents protested and threatened to 
disempower the government, specifically interest groups within the mining sector and in 
particular the trade unions.  
As the foreign debt payments accumulated, and fearing losing popularity, the government gave in 
to the escalating political and economic forces by backpedaling on the IMF supported SAP. 
Indeed, in 1987, the Government cut ties with the two Bretton Woods Institutions and tries to go 
it alone though its own economic programme which it called “Growth from Own Resources”. 
Inflation grew and the situation became politically volatile in the Copper belt.  
The economic reform policies introduced in the 1980s had some effect on restoring macro-
economic balance but political support was always lukewarm and while the reforms appeared to 
be effective momentarily and, for a while, the financial system and economy was responsive 
toward growth, by 1985, the economy took a slump, and entered a recession in 1989. Political 
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debate and unrest mounted against Kaunda’s one party State – especially from the Zambia 
Congress of Trade Unions – ZCTU – led by Fredrick Chiluba, as communism collapsed in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and while inflation in Zambia spiraled following the rapid 
depreciation of the Zambian currency – the Kwacha. 
It was becoming clear by 1990 that the one-party State and the socialist leaning policies 
implemented by Kaunda’s party UNIP (United National Independence Party) were ineffective in 
addressing the dire economic condition of the country. Kaunda was forced to re-establish multi-
party politics and hold multi-party elections in 1991 after a new Constitution was enacted earlier 
that year. Kaunda’s “Growth from Own Resources” economic programme quickly unraveled as 
the government backpedaled on the reforms. The maize and fertilizer subsidies were enhanced, 
the allocation of foreign currency through a “distribution pipeline” managed by the Bank of 
Zambia  lengthened, and civil service wages were increased to gain political mileage in the run 
up to the November 1991 general elections.64 The consequence of this was the further loss of 
donor confidence by the bi-lateral donor countries, who, following the Bretton Woods 
Institutions,  pulled out their support for the government, owing to its breach of commitment to 
attaining economic reform and recovery. 
Assessing the developments throughout this period, where the UNIP government maintained 
economic and political control of the nation for nearly three decades, copper dependence turned 
out to be a source of fiscal instability and ensured that the economy was always susceptible to 
external shocks. The economic quagmire into which Zambia increasingly became immured in 
the 1980s up to 1991 was the major factor in the UNIP government’s loss of political dominance 
in the country. In addition, the State’s administration and control of mining revenue and foreign 
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exchange created a powerful political elite who were nevertheless reliant on the copper mining 
sector for political support. Consequently, they developed many strategies aimed at appeasing 
urban residents in general, and the miners through broadly accepted fiscal entitlements (i.e. 
subsidies ranging from food to housing) financed from mineral profits, as opposed to using those 
resources to finance programmes and policies that promoted long term growth for both urban and 
rural areas. 
The national budget and Zambia’s fiscal position had become progressively unsustainable since 
the mid-1970s, being the major victim of falling global copper prices with a growing dependence 
on donor assistance to finance an ever-widening fiscal deficit. With no donor support or no 
international financial institution willing to loan to the State from the latter part of the 1980s 
because of the president’s socialist approach to growth, which he called ‘humanism’, the future 
of the one-party State became untenable. The inadequate mineral export revenues and the 
government’s inability to take long term measures to diversify into agriculture and other 
productive sectors were among the leading causes of persistently high rates of poverty and 
considerable income disparity between a small urban elite and the majority who lived in peri-
urban shanty compounds and the rural areas. By 1991, the dwindling proceeds from the 
country’s copper exports had negatively impacted the Government’s social expenditure 
programmes primarily aimed at appeasing the urban population – especially in the mining towns 
on the Copperbelt. Rationing of basic goods and services became the order of the day because of 
the dearth of foreign exchange and the underdevelopment of the industrial and agricultural 
sectors, leading people to demand for political change two decades after the country became a 
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one-party state in the early 1970s.65  
3.4 Structural Adjustment Reforms under the MMD since 1991 
The opposition Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), led by Frederick Chiluba, the 
former leader of the powerful Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) which had 
spearheaded opposition to Kaunda’s one party State and socialist economic policies won the 
elections in November 1991. The MMD ran on a progressive economic platform and quickly re-
engaged support from the international community, particularly the IMF and World Bank. This 
support was given on the basis of a promise to embark on a thorough structural adjustment 
programme (called the Economic Recovery Programme - ERP) modelled on the typical 
“Washington Consensus” model with a further commitment to transparent and responsible 
administration.66 The new Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) party comprised a 
diverse alliance of intellectuals, business interests, students and trade unions that were 
enthusiastic about bringing a different style of leadership from its predecessor UNIP. Still, the 
new government was passed a poisoned chalice in the form of an unstable and stagnant economy 
based on an ailing copper sector, a three-figure inflation rate which had the potential to spiral 
into hyper-inflation, a high foreign debt burden and a depreciating currency, unemployment and 
under-employment for a rapidity growing and young population, low productivity especially in 
the mines and parastatal sectors which dominated the economy, increased poverty and large 
disparities in income and wealth. 
The new SAP was designed with the aim of restoring macro-economic stability and arresting the 
economic malaise and decline. Implementation of the SAP immediately began winning back 
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donor confidence, with international donors supporting Zambia with close to US$1.5 billion in 
1992, reaching its all-time peak. The MMD’s SAP, like similar programmes across Sub-Saharan 
Africa at the time, was a full blown “Washington Consensus” SAP which included restoring 
macroeconomic equilibrium; public sector reform; liberalization of the foreign exchange market 
and domestic product markets; the sale of nationalized industries and businesses; and 
agricultural sector reforms.67 
3.4.1 Macroeconomic Equilibrium  
During the transition from a one-party State to multi-party politics, Zambia experienced a 
record high inflation rate – reaching an annual rate of 127% in 1993, the highest it had ever 
been since Independence. During this period, following the liberalization of the exchange rate, 
the Zambian kwacha experienced rapid depreciation and interest rates rose making access to 
credit unaffordable. The Economic Reform Program (ERP) was launched by the government to 
re-establish macroeconomic stability and this was broadly achieved by 1995, when inflation had 
been reduced to about 26%the exchange rate stabilized (as donor support resumed) and interest 
rates fell. Yet the country was far from stable politically and key economic decisions – in 
particular the privatization of the copper mines themselves and their consequent massive re-
capitalization using the resources that could be mobilized by the MNCs, were delayed 
throughout the 1990s.68
   
This success was to come after the privatization of ZCCM in 2000, albeit on relatively 
unfavorable terms, as by the end of 1999, ZCCM was hemorrhaging money as copper prices 
had once again fallen and the privatization process itself was more like a fire sale. The MNCs 
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mid-1990s. As evidence of this uncertainty, Chiluba’s government banned Kaunda from running for office in 1995, and in 1997 
there was an attempted coup d'état. Consequently, donors repeatedly threatened to withdraw financial support. 
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which bought the mines in the first years of the 21st century was able to negotiate favorable 
“development agreements” with the Government which included generous tax concessions and 
– most importantly from the perspective of this paper – no liability for past environmental 
degradation caused by the copper mines.  The poor performance of the copper mining sector 
since the mid-1970s, had gradually led to an increasingly inadequate management of the 
negative environmental impacts arising from copper mining and ore smelting activities. Thus, 
during the sale of the various mines operated by ZCCM to various MNCs, liability for the 
adverse environmental legacies was an important matter throughout the negotiations, with the 
private MNC investors unwilling to accept legal responsibility for historical environmental 
liabilities, given both the degree and gravity of mining-related ecological and public health 
obligations that had arisen over the previous three decades.  
Further, as part of the ERP, the government introduced a “cash budget system” in 1993 as an 
integral measure to reduce the high inflation rate. This restricted the government to available 
funds, spending only from tax revenues already collected. While this measure was very effective 
in reducing inflation, and restoring macro-economic stability, it also saw a large contraction in 
public expenditure, even on areas like health (including environmental health programmes 
important for mining communities) and education where demands were rising as a result of a 
rapidly growing and youthful population and in the face of the HIV pandemic. In 1996, when the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic was at its highest in Zambia, before the advent of ARV treatment, 16% of 
the nation’s adult population was living with HIV, with higher occurrence in urban areas. The 
Copper belt and Lusaka were reported to have the highest number of people living with the virus 
and the average life expectancy rate dipped below 40 years.6970. Indeed, under the “cash budget” 
                                                          
69 Republic of Zambia (2002b) Zambia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Lusaka, Zambia. 
35 
system, the MMD administration’s public spending cuts were considerable.71 This undermined 
the administration’s ability to surmount its political reliance on urban communities and the 
miners.  Instead of reducing the fiscal costs associated with a bloated civil service, the MMD 
administration opted to rid itself of publicly owned ventures (thereby creating large numbers of 
retrenchees) and cutting social expenditure. This restrictive fiscal stance was sustained 
throughout the 1990s and slowing wore away the political support for the MMD Government. 
3.4.2 Debt Relief through the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative 
Apart from the privatization of the mines in 2000, one initiative that has proved vital for the 
development of Zambia’s economy and public finances has been the forgiveness of the clear 
majority of its foreign debt but this did not take effect until 2005 because of 15 years of 
“structural adjustment”.72 In 1991, Zambia was heavily in debt to foreign creditors, mainly the 
two Bretton Woods Institutions and foreign governments, amounting to more than US 7 billion 
dollars. While US 0.8 billion dollars was forgiven by way of debt cancellation in 1993, this the 
rate of debt forgiveness slowed during the 1990s as foreign creditors (chiefly the IMF, WB and 
bi-lateral donor nations) attached policy conditionality’s linked to the full implementation of the 
ERP before providing more debt relief. Thus, during the period of 1991 to 2005 Zambia 
continued to be one of the most deeply indebted nations in the world.73 
The consequent foreign debt overhang and interest payments not only absorbed foreign exchange 
but restricted social spending throughout the period of economic recovery. However, during the 
early years of the new century, under the leadership of late president Levy Mwanawasa (2002-
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2008), Zambia become eligible for debt relief under the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative, enabling the write-off of two-thirds of the debt, provided certain further economic 
adjustment and fiscal conditions were met. This lead to a Government preparing a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that began to more effectively address social issues, 
particularly the rapidly rising problem of HIV/AIDS with the advent of ARV treatment for 
people living with the virus. Zambia qualified for HIPC debt relief in 2005 and the foreign debt 
burden was dramatically reduced – both through the HIPC Initiative itself and via other parallel 
debt forgiveness programmes by other bilateral creditors.  
This has allowed for fiscal expansion since 2005, but, following the 2008 global financial crisis, 
copper prices fell again and after reviving around 2010/11 fell further from 2012. As in the 
1970s, the Government has tried to sustain higher levels of public spending through external 
borrowing – but this time on the Sovereign Bond market and has issued US$ 3 billion of 
Eurobond debt in the last 5 years. In addition, indebtedness to China has spiraled over the last ten 
years as China has financed large infrastructure projects - especially roads, stadia and airports - 
which has added to the foreign debt stock. Subsidies have also reappeared, especially for fuel 
and energy, and the fiscal deficit rose to over 10 percent of GDP in 2015. This has led the current 
Minister of Finance, Hon. Felix Mutati M.P. to announce in Parliament that Government will 
need to return to the IMF in 2017 to negotiate a new economic recovery programme.    
Zambia stands as one of the most liberalized economies in southern Africa today. This has 
mainly been due to the removal of product, foreign exchange and labor market controls and the 
other elements of the “Washington Consensus” policy mix that has been implemented over the 
last quarter of a century. The impact of this liberalization of the economy differed significantly 
from the import-substitution economic policies of the Kaunda era, and created favorable market 
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conditions that was  attractive to investment in an open economy where cross-border trade was 
encouraged.74 The economic liberalization policy has encouraged massive foreign direct 
investment – especially in the mines since their privatization in 2000 – but spelt the death knell 
for many former  nationalized enterprises that did not have managers with the entrepreneurial 
skills needed to take advantage of this new environment.  
3.4.4 Sale of State Owned Enterprises and Parastals 
With the elimination of protection from foreign competition – the policy that was central to the 
import substitution economic strategy - virtually all parastatals went out of business unless, like 
the Dairiboard which was taken over by the Italian MNC Parmalat, they were taken over by 
generally foreign investors. By 1997, 80% of the state-owned enterprises had either been sold off 
or dissolved.75 The closure of many parastatals in the 1990s, and the consequent loss of many 
formal sector jobs, together with the evident weakness of ZCCM, weakened the power of the 
mining trade unions. Thus, the privatization of the mines in 2000 found a much more docile 
labour movement than the one that played a key role in the downfall of the Kaunda regime and 
workers, including miners, were prepared to accept much lower real wages and poorer working 
and living conditions. Indeed, ZCCM had provided education and health facilities in its many 
mine schools and hospitals as well as operating excellent sports and recreation facilities for its 
workers and their families. However, virtually all these services and facilities were either handed 
over the Government or the local councils after privatization or just allowed to become 
dilapidated.  
3.5 Transformed Development: 2000-2015 
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Since the start of 21st century, following a dramatic recovery in copper prices in the first decade 
of the century and massive recapitalization of the mines by their new MNC owners, the Zambian 
economy has performed much better than in any previous period since the first years after 
independence (when copper prices were also high). Further, following the HIPC debt relief and 
the creation of more fiscal space in the national Budget, there has been more resources both from 
the private and public sectors to support the diversification of the economy – especially in the 
agriculture, tourism and agro-processing sectors. Between 2001 and 2012, the nation achieved 
average annual GDP growth rates of over twice the population growth rate raising average per 
capita income for the first time since the early years after independence.  However, while the 
economy has grown, the distribution of the benefits has been far from equitable and Zambia is 
one of the most unequal countries in the world in terms of income and ownership of wealth. This 
can at least in part be explained by the lack of investment in education and skills development in 
recent decades, as well as continued weakness of the trade union movement. Thus, those school 
leavers who do manage to get work often do so in poorly paid jobs, often casual employment 
terms.  
 Further, though the economy has been generally performing well, politically Zambia society has 
become more fragmented and disunited - especially on tribal lines - as evidenced by an increase 
in political violence and electoral fraud since the 2001 general elections. This resulting increase 
in political instability has threatened the growth of the economy and Zambia’s political 
leadership has also changed several times over the past decade and a half which has caused 
further political uncertainty.76  
After failing to change the Constitution to allow him to stand a third time, Frederick Chiluba 
hand-picked Levy Mwanawasa to run on the MMD ticket in the 2001 elections. Mwanawasa 
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won the vote against Anderson Mazoka, a former Chief Executive Officer of the Anglo-
American Corporation and a Tonga by tribe who received widespread support from his home 
area. There were claims from the opposition that the voting was rigged. Indeed, soon after the 
election Mazoka took ill and died – with claims that he had been poisoned by the ruling MMD. 
Mwanawasa was re-elected for a second term in 2006, winning against Hichilema Hakainde who 
took over the leadership of the opposition (Tonga-based) party from Mazoka. 
Despite having won the general election for a second term, Mwanawasa died in France before 
the end of his presidency in August 2008. Following Mr. Mwanawasa's death, his vice president 
Rupiah Banda succeeded him to the office of president, but he later went on to lose the 2011 
general election by a small margin against another opposition leader, Michael Sata, who had 
established a splinter party – the Patriotic Front (PF) – from the MMD when Chiluba had chosen 
Mwanawasa as his successor in 2001. Hakainde also polled well (but lost) in the 2011 election 
again getting support from his home area in Southern Province but also building support in 
Western and North Western provinces. 
 However, like his predecessor Levy Mwanawasa, Sata also died during a trip abroad in 2014 
whist visiting Israel, and he was succeeded by Edgar Lungu, also from the PF, who become the 
6th president of the republic of Zambia, a position he holds today after winning the highly 
contentious August 2016 general elections where Hakainde lost again but by about 100,000 votes 
out of over 3 million cast. Once again, the voting patterns in the 2016 elections increasingly 
reflected ethnic politics, despite Zambia being a  multiethnic country. Ethnicity has historically 
been utilized as a key determining factor when deciding when it comes to political leadership 
and winning general elections in Zambia. Tribal ethnicity has been used either to discredit 
political competitors from their own ethnic group or to reinforce support from the politician’s 
40 
ethnic group.  As such, during the last presidential election in Zambia, politicians from the ruling 
party once again relayed upon using ‘tribalism’ as a weapon to disrepute their opponents, admits 
other external factors affecting party choice, i.e. (media projections, popularity and economic 
and political benefits). 
CHAPTER 4: Environmental Assessment of Copper Mining  
4.1 Copper Mining and Processing 
Copper production is not an ecologically friendly activity. The process of removing copper from 
copper ore varies depending on the type of copper ore and concentration of copper in the ore. 
From mining and crushing through hydro- and pyrometallurgical processing to filtration, each 
process of copper production can have substantial adverse effects on air quality, surface and 
groundwater quality, and the land due to foreign materials introduced or toxic chemical residues 
left behind (see Figure 5).77 Some of these ore purification processes are conducted at the mine 
site itself, while in other instances, they are done at a distance.78 Copper production, like many 
other industries in Zambia, is subject to extensive environmental regulation by government 
ministries and other stakeholders, especially as it relates to air and water quality, materials 
handling and waste disposal practices, due to the impact it has on both humans and the 
environment. 
 
 
4.1.1 Ore Extraction  
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Copper ore (the bulk of which is sulfide minerals containing only 0.5 to 2.0 percent copper) can 
be extracted from the earth in several ways. Ore occurring at some depth is obtained by 
underground mining involving the sinking of vertical shafts into the earth to an appropriate depth 
to reach the copper ore layers, and then driving horizontal tunnels into the ore strata.  
Ores nearer the surface can be much more cheaply accessed through open cast mining by 
quarrying or digging out the ore after removing the shallow surface layers (called the overlay). 
As this is a much cheaper extraction method, globally, the bulk of copper extraction is through 
open cast mining.79 
Once the ore is removed from the earth, it is necessary to process it to obtain 99.99% pure 
copper. This requires treating the copper ore through a series of processes to separate the copper 
content (often less than 0.6%) from the surrounding rock, called “gangue” (and small proportions 
of other minerals such as gold, silver, iron, nickel and uranium).80 
4.1.2 Ore Concentration–Separating Minerals from the Gangue 
The first processes are physical and involve the crushing and grinding of the ore and then 
concentrating it through a process called “froth flotation.” Once crushed, the powdered ore is 
mixed with a paraffin-like oil that makes the copper mineral particles water repellant. It is then 
fed into a bath of water containing a foaming agent. Jets of air are forced through the tub, and the 
water repellant copper mineral particles are picked up by the bubbles in the foam and rise to the 
surface forming "froth." The unwanted waste rock (the gangue) falls to the bottom of the bath. 
The foam is skimmed off the tub surface, and the "enriched ore" (now containing about 25% 
copper) is taken for “roasting.” 
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4.1.3 Smelting to form “Matte” and “Blister” Copper 
The next processes are chemical and involve the smelting or heating to high temperature of the 
enriched ore with fluxes such as silica and limestone. The ore melts and reacts with the fluxes, 
while most of the impurities form a slag that rises to the top of the smelter and can be easily 
removed. The molten ore is drained off from the bottom of the foundry and is a mixture of 
copper sulfides and iron sulfides called “matte.” 
The liquid matte is then oxidized by passing air through it to form “blister copper” (which is 
99% pure copper) and sulfur dioxide. The term “blister” derives from the fact that the process 
produces bubbles of sulfur dioxide on the surface of the copper. The blister copper is then cast 
into anodes ready for the final stage of the process—electronic refining through the process of 
electrolysis.  
4.1.4 Electronic Refining to Form Pure Copper  
In electric refining, the blister copper anodes are immersed in an electrolyte solution (a solution 
that conducts electricity) containing copper sulfate and sulfuric acid. Pure copper cathodes are 
arranged between the blister copper anodes, and a current of over 200A is passed through the 
solution. Under these conditions, copper atoms dissolve from the (relatively) impure anode to 
form copper ions (by giving up two electrons). These ions migrate through the electrolyte 
solution and recombine with electrons on the cathode to form a new layer of pure copper atoms 
on the cathode. Gradually the anode is eroded, and the cathode grows. After that, the cathodes 
are removed, and the pure copper (99.99%) is scrapped off. Impurities in the blister copper 
anodes either dissolve in the electrolyte solution (such as iron and nickel) or fall to the bottom as 
sludge from which valuable minerals such as gold, silver, and platinum are removed. 
4.1.5 Leaching  
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Apart from underground and open cast mining, some mines extract copper ore from the earth by 
passing dilute sulfuric acid through the layers of gangue containing the copper ore. The slowly 
percolating acid dissolves the copper to form copper sulfate, and the copper is then recovered by 
electronic refining described above. This method of ore extraction uses much less energy than 
traditional mining (e.g. no energy required to super heat the smelters), and no waste gasses like 
sulfur dioxide are given off. However, there is the apparent danger of contaminating ground and 
surface water systems. 
4.1.6 Recovery of Copper from Old Tailings of Gangue 
Where historic waste in the form of “tailings” from past mining activity is now found to have 
“economic” quantities of copper content using 21st-century technology, some copper is extracted 
from these historic tailings for further processing. This is occurring at the “Black Mountain” 
tailing site in Kitwe in the Copper Belt Province. 
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                                                       Figure 6. Ecological Effects of Copper Production81 
Copper production is not an ecologically benevolent action. From mining and crushing through 
hydro- and pyrometallurgical dispensation to purifying, copper production can have important 
hostile influences on air quality, surface and ground water quality, and the land (see figure 7 
above). While these influences can be severe when the ingredients handled include poisonous or 
hazardous substances (e.g., Copper ores with a comparatively high concentration of arsenic). 
Thus, uncontrolled copper smelting processes affect the quality of air through the emitting large 
quantities of particulate matter, trace elements, and sulfur oxides, which can have adverse effects 
on human health. Equally, land is changed significantly because of open‐ cut mining with large 
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pits being created from mining processes resulting in waste rock being generated from. Adverse 
water quality impacts are caused primarily by land disposal practices that fail to contain wastes, 
by run-on and run-off controls that are inadequate to prevent surface water from flowing through 
impoundments, or by groundwater infiltrating surface impoundments.82 In Kitwe, Mufulira, 
Chingola and Ndola, where some casting takes place, yellow fumes produced by sulphur oxide 
can be seen in the air and respiratory difficulties are not unusual. In Kabwe town,  the town has 
experienced has a long-standing issue of lead poisoning and, notwithstanding the scaling down 
of lead and zinc mining in the area.83 
4.2 Regulatory Environmental Laws and Copper Mining in Zambia 
This section will examine whether Zambia has built the necessary legislative framework and 
administrative capacity to effectively regulate, protect and implement environmental 
conservation measures, especially in areas affected by large-scale copper mining operations. It 
will also examine the roles different stakeholders play within the copper mining industry and the 
significance of stimulating environmental protection awareness among all stakeholders. This is 
important especially now, when most countries are attempting to attain sustainable development. 
This commitment includes working to achieve four of the United Nations' Seventeen Sustainable 
Development Goals of (I) good health and wellbeing, (ii) clean water and sanitation, (iii) 
sustainable cities and communities and (iv) responsible consumption and production, all require 
sound environmental protection and management practices for their attainment. 
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Section 4.2 1 Ministries and Departments Pertinent to Environmental Protection in Zambia  
In this investigation of global copper production and how copper mining results in environmental 
degradation in Zambia, we explore “environmental governance,” a term that denotes the set of 
regulatory procedures and organizations by which political players affect environmental 
activities and outcomes. Pertinent to this discussion are key elements such as the “political-
economic relationships”84 that governments personify, and the “characteristics, activities, and 
outcomes”85 that form the nature and efficacy of environmental regulation.86  
 
       Figure 7. Organogram of Environmental Management Institutions in Zambia 87 
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There are several governmental organizations and agencies tasked with addressing 
environmental management issues across different sections of society in Zambia, most notably 
the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection,88 previously known as 
Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources (MTENR). This ministry is the focal 
point where all matters of environmental conservation and management in Zambia are addressed. 
The effectiveness of the Ministry depends on capacity and performance of several departments 
and agencies housed under this ministerial body that aim to address the significant problems in 
the current environmental governance of Zambia.  
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources Management89 is the arm of the ministry 
responsible for formulating and implementing policy designed to attain sound ecological and 
natural resources management. It researches and coordinates different methods of responding to 
any adverse environmental impact that may occur in the country, such as the pollution of rivers. 
This was the case in 2005 when the Kafue River was contaminated with sulfuric acid and other 
toxic chemicals by Konkola Copper Mines.90 The department has also been authorized to 
manage, coordinate, monitor and assess the actions of other policymaking agencies for their 
environmental impacts on behalf of the government.  
The Zambia Environmental Management Agency91 (ZEMA) investigates the potential negative 
impacts of any developments—including copper mining developments—through conducting 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) protocols and the development and application of 
environmental governance guidelines across a broad variety of sectors. It has been responsible 
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since its inception in 1992 (when it was called the Environmental Council of Zambia) for 
undertaking EIAs and issuing environmental licenses to authorize the operation of development 
activities in a sustainable manner and to ensure that these developments remain environmentally 
sustainable.92 
The Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water Development93 is responsible for a broad range of 
issues including environmental conservation measures related to the mining sector and the 
protection of the nation’s ground and surface water resources. It is also responsible for the 
development, supervision, and enhancement of environmental standards and enforcing job safety 
measures in the mines. This ministry was the result of a merger between two departments to 
oversee two major environmentally-related areas: mineral resource management and water 
affairs. The Department of Mines Safety attempts to ensure that mine safety regulations are 
observed in the mines to protect the health and safety of the mines’ workforce per the mine 
health and safety laws and regulations that it promulgates.94 The Department of Water Affairs is 
tasked with conserving the nation’s surface and groundwater resources and, in partnership with 
local municipalities, to supply potable water to homes and businesses. Surveillance of the water 
quality in Zambia’s main surface water bodies (lakes, rivers and streams) as well as in the 
nation’s extensive ground water aquifers together with building awareness related to the 
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sustainable use of Zambia’s water resources are but two of the objectives of the department, 
especially as related to industrial mining activities in the country.95 
4.2.2 Environmental Legislation and National Guidelines in Zambia 
The Zambian laws and guidelines regarding environmental conservation are comparatively up to 
date, and their development span a period of three decades across various ministries. In 2009, a 
major review of the actual implementation of Zambia's environmental conservation policies led 
the government to launch a new National Policy on the Environment (NPE), intended to 
condense all the existing laws and regulations in the country into a harmonized set of policies. 
However, like most cases in Zambia, the main problems lie not in the policy or legal framework 
but rather in their implementation. Due primarily to budget constraints, the government has 
failed to effectively implement the NPE, and the sustainable management of the environment and 
exploitation of its natural resources remains elusive. 
Currently, the principal and fundamental piece of legislation that guides and regulates 
environmental management and administration in the nation is the Environmental Management 
Act (No 12 of 2011).96 The Act contains modern features and institutional arrangements related 
to the conservation of natural resources and environmental protection. It was through this act that 
the nation’s principal governing body for environmental management, formerly known as the 
Environmental Council of Zambia, became referred to as the Zambia Environmental 
Management Agency (ZEMA). Salient features of the act include: 
I.Prevention of contamination and ecological degradation, including that from historical 
mining operations. 
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II.Provision of cooperative ecological governance grounded in the values of the shared 
heritage of both present and future generations. 
III.Development of environmentally sound strategies, policies, and programs aimed at 
allowing sustainable use of natural resources for economic and social development while 
enforcing environmental management regulations. 
The environmental laws in Zambia have been more efficiently implemented under the new 
Act than they were under its predecessor, the 1990 Environmental Protection and Pollution 
Control Act and its 1999 Amendment (No 12 of 1990 and No 12 of 1999). However, parts of 
the old guidelines and regulations are still being adhered to under the new law, because the 
new Act covers only specific damage to the environment that is produced by contamination 
or land use. The other issues are addressed in separate laws and regulations, and a high level 
of cooperation is required between other government departments, agencies and local 
municipalities for their execution if sound ecological measures are to be implemented in 
Zambia. These regulations include: 
I. Waste Management (SI 71 of 1993) 
II. Water Pollution Control (SI 72 of 1993) 
III. Pesticides and Toxic Substances (1994) 
IV. Air Pollution Control (SI 142 of 1996) 
V. Environmental Impact Assessments (SI 28 of 1997) 
VI. Hazardous Waste Management (SI of 2001) 
Some of the salient features of the 2011 Environmental Management Act, in its attempt to 
support and strengthen the efficacy of future environmental conservation efforts, relate to 
ensuring that the policies and measures that are adopted continue to work in the face of varying 
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socio-economic situations.97 
4.3 Stakeholders’ Effects on Environmental Conservation 
 The copper mining industry has many stakeholders; for this research paper, key stakeholders 
have been identified that represent a wide range of interests. Their role is to guarantee that their 
respective agendas are recognized and their benefits and wishes promoted. Apart from the 
Government (including municipal councils) and the private mine owners themselves, these 
stakeholders include the church, NGOs and civil society, the Mine Workers Union of Zambia 
(MUZ), the judiciary and the media. Each of these stakeholders plays an instrumental role in 
influencing the operations of the copper mining industry, the distribution of its benefits and the 
mitigation of the negative environmental impacts of copper extraction and ore processing 
activities set out in section 4.1 of this paper.  Some of these stakeholders, like the church, civil 
society and NGOs act as defenders of the environment and the communities affected by adverse 
impacts on it. They do so by relentlessly holding government to account to perform its statutory 
duties to its citizens under such laws as the 2012 Environmental Management Act and 
pressurizing the mining companies to execute their commercial operations to minimize and 
mitigate any adverse environmental externalities arising from their activities in the wider interest 
of all.  
An example of this occurred in 2011 when the Supreme Court of Zambia upheld a High Court 
verdict which found Konkola Copper Mines (KCM) guilty of water pollution in 2006 which 
poisoned thousands of Cingula residents. The judgment was delivered in favour of victims who 
had died after having ingested contaminated water from the Kafue River, which had been 
poisoned by mining waste discharged into it by KCM. It took five long years of the villages 
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working hand in hand with the NGO that sued the mining company before KCM was fined two 
million dollars in damages. The High Court made the judgment and set the damages due to 
KCM’s “gross recklessness.”98 
The role of civil society and NGOs this case was fundamental, as they further lobbied the 
government and the mining industry to strengthen their arrangements to protect the environment 
and the mining communities affected by copper production. The result was the strengthening of 
the policy and legal framework as already referred to in section 4.2 above.  
Other vital stakeholders in environmental conservation include the media, which serves to 
inform the public on all subjects pertinent to their health, well-being, financial status and 
ecological position, by acting as watchdogs of the actions of the mines.99 On the other hand, the 
media, either state-owned or independent, can be aligned with the government and/or the 
interests of the mining MNCs and broadcast or publish what is pleasant from the MNCs’ or 
Government’s  viewpoint (e.g. publicizing “Corporate Social Responsibility” spending by the 
mines while downplaying any news of violations of statutory limits to air or water quality). This 
underlines the need for reputable sources of independent media which also have the capacity for 
good investigative journalism for the public to be properly informed about the true costs and 
benefits of copper mining. Unfortunately, with an increasingly factionalized and tribal political 
environment, most “independent” media are “aligned” to the Government or the opposition and 
their credibility is undermined. Further, the capacity for well researched investigative journalism 
is also limited. 
                                                          
98 "Chief Editor." LusakaTimescom. 2015. Accessed December 21, 2016. https://www.lusakatimes.com/2015/04/03/the-
supreme-court-upholds-kcms-high-court-guilty-verdict-of-water-pollution-which-poisoned-more-than-2000-people-in-2006/.  
99 Ibid. 
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The church’s role in advocating for social justice is realized in the context of this paper by it 
playing a reconciliation role, facilitating dialogue between the parties and communities affected 
by contaminants arising from the mines and the mines when they are accused of causing this 
injustice. Its key role is to act as a mediator. 
Finally, the Mine Workers Union of Zambia’s role is to promote the interests of their members 
who are employees of the mines by championing the cause of fair salaries for their members and 
to secure better and safer working conditions in line with the state regulations on working 
environment conditions. As already observed in Chapter three however, their power has become 
greatly restricted from its zenith in 1991 as the hardships of structural adjustment and 
privatization has cowed their members’ appetite for any militant action. Thus, in practice, the 
extent to which they can affect the behavior and decisions of the mine owners is limited and 
regularly the interests of the mines take precedence over those of their workers.  
4.4 Zambian Copper Mine and Smelter Pollutants 
While air pollutants do arise from ore extraction activities – especially open cast mining – and 
ground and surface water contamination occurs wherever leaching takes place or where water is 
pumped from deep underground mines, the primary source of pollution in Zambia’s mining 
sector is smelters. Post 2001, most of the formerly nationalized and unprofitable copper mines 
under the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited (ZCCM) have been sold off, and the new 
investors have revitalized the mines through huge injections of capital and the scaling up of 
production to make returns on their investments. However, given the arguments set out in 
Chapter One of this paper relating to how intrinsically the mining MNCs are tied into the global 
capitalist system where the governing logic is the maximization of returns to shareholders and 
senior managers and the minimization of costs, protection of the environment is most likely to be 
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undervalued, especially if mitigation measures are costly and local regulatory watchdogs can be 
bribed or otherwise “internalized” into seeing things from the mine owners standpoint. 
Regardless, several serious ecological consequences are clearly linked to operating a copper 
mines and smelters and the significant ones are considered here. 
4.4.1 Air Pollution Impacts: Sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
The chief cause of sulfur dioxide contamination is from the roasting and purifying of copper-
bearing sulfide minerals in the Copper belt. The principal ore is chalcopyrite (CuFeS2), and the 
first phase in most procedures is roasting or smelting the ore in the open air, which oxidizes 
roughly all the copper and generates sulfur dioxide.100 The actions at Nkana smelter generate 
sulfur dioxide and dust. Mufulira copper smelter is another principal source of sulfur dioxide air 
pollution. Both Nkana and Mufulira smelters adversely affect the surrounding communities with 
poor air quality. Calculations from those areas have revealed a sulfur dioxide concentration of 
500-1000 μg/m3, significantly surpassing the nation’s regulation limit of 50μg/m3.101 The 
population of nearby residential towns in the Kitwe area are daily exposed to high SO2 
concentrations, as they are near the smelters. Children, women and the elderly are particularly 
badly affected. The poor quality of the air increases the incidence of respiratory disease-related 
health problems such as asthma and lung infections among the general inhabitants in those areas, 
especially those with extremely high exposure to SO2 because they live close to, and downwind 
of, the largest source of the SO2 emissions -  the smelters. 
 
 
                                                          
100  S. Simukanga. Status of Air Pollution In Zambia. Retrieved from  https://www.sei-
international.org/mediamanager/documents/Projects/Atmospheric/RapidC/AirPolZam.PDF. Accessed on 12/22/16 
101 Ibid. SGAB and others, 2005 at P.12 
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4.4.2 Water Pollution Impacts 
Water contamination in Zambia is mostly created by liquid waste from mining actions that is 
released into water bodies, and nutrient-rich runoff from farming lands in the Kafue and 
Mazabuka areas.102 In the Copper Belt Province, many groups do not have access to steady 
piped, purified water from the local municipalities; rather, they rely on boreholes which pump up 
ground water or on streams, rivers and water bodies for their households and livelihoods water 
requirements. Copper production growth poses a hazard, as water pollution arises from leaching, 
mining dump runoff, leakage from tailings dams and unintended releases of raw wastewater 
containing acidic liquids from small particles of good rock (silt or sediment). The valley tailings 
dams have been shaped into huge ponds containing acidic levels of sediment and it is this residue 
that has created environmental problems over time that affect local communities. 
The noteworthy contributors to metal contamination are Nchanga, Nkana, and Konkola mining 
operations.103 In Kitwe town, the Konkola Copper Mine (KCM)’s Nchanga smelter has been the 
primary source of pollution of the Kafue River, with reported cases of a few of KCM’s pipelines 
having discharged significant amounts of acidic fluids into numerous tributaries (Chingola and 
Mushishima streams) of the Kafue, one of Zambia’s major rivers.104 The Environmental Council 
of Zambia (ECZ)’s certified statement in 2006 highlighted incidents of water pollution, finding 
KCM liable for having negligently polluted the Kafue River, with reports at the time having 
shown liquid contained 1,000% more copper, 77,000% more manganese and 10,000% more 
                                                          
102 "Environmental Council of Zambia." Accessed December 24, 2016. http://apps.unep.org/publications/pmtdocuments/-
National%20Solid%20Waste%20Management%20Strategy%20for%20Zambia-
2004National%20Solid%20Waste%20Management%20Strategy(1).pdf.  
103 Ibid. SGAB and others, 2005. 
104 Environmental Council of Zambia, ECZ (2006) Report on Investigation of the Pollution of the River Kafue, Mushishima and 
Chingola Streams by the Tailings Leach Plant of Konkola Copper Mines at the Nchanga Integrated Business Unit. 
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cobalt than recommended levels, creating grave consequences on the environment and human 
life, with many victims having reported suffering severe digestive and organ problems.105  
Such unacceptable releases of polluted waste water are not the only difficulty created by copper 
mining production. The Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives has further stated that 
populations living near the Kafue River have been economically affected by the pollution of the 
Kafue. Officials from the ministry have claimed that “agricultural farmers, i.e. Hippo village 
communities, suffered economic effects from the contamination of the Mushishima stream, 
being the only source water, thus affecting over 100 households in the village, which are all 
small scale farmers”.106 Those living near KCM’s Nchanga plant have been the victims of  a 
similar fate, because residues and sludge from the tailing dams have overflowed onto cultivated 
areas, contaminating the soil , thus rendering the land infertile, preventing agriculturalists from 
cultivating food products. Losses incurred by farmers was estimated to total K100,300,000 
(£12,641) in lost income during 2005 alone.107 
4.4.3 Land and Soil Pollution Impacts 
Copper mining, both small and large scale, can create tremendous ecological devastation and 
squalor, rendering land unfit for either human or animal life through the degradation of the 
topsoil.108 In the copper mining areas of the Copper Belt Province, the buildup of metals in the 
topsoil has been a direct outcome of wind-borne dust elements blown from the mines, 
supplemented by other fallout contaminants from the copper smelters. It must be noted that the 
soil in the natural environment of the mining areas has been tested and naturally contains some 
                                                          
105 Quoted in A. Fraser and J. Lungu, For Whom the Windfalls? Winners and Losers in the Privatization of Zambia’s Copper 
Mines, 2006 
106 Ibid. 
107 Letter from Phillip Simbule (District Agricultural Coordinator, Chingola District) to the Senior Legal Council, KCM, 17 January 
2007 (reference no15/DACOCN/3/28/1) 
108 Ibid. 
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traces of metal elements within subsoil structures (e.g. in many areas chromium and nickel are 
found in greater concentrations than the average found underneath the surface soil layer 70-90 
cm).109 
However, in mining areas, extremely high metal element concentrations have been found, far 
above any naturally occurring levels, gravely threatening the environment and local communities 
around them.  This was established in a full scholarship on soil pollution conducted on the 
Copper Belt.110 The scholarship comprised of thorough field investigations in five Copper belt 
mining towns that included Mufulira and Chingola, and to a smaller degree with Kalulushi, 
Chililabombwe, and Chambishi.111 The samples collected revealed that many contained 
extremely high concentrations of metal elements which  were clearly linked with mining area 
contaminants, in contrast with the concentrations of these metal elements occurring naturally in 
non-mining areas (see Figure 8).112 
It is hard to ascertain how the study’s original estimates were made of the economic and 
financial impact of the use of these contaminated soils for agricultural livelihoods of the local 
population. However, in the case of these Copper belt towns, subsurface samples demonstrate 
that the surface soil layer contained at least “ten times more and at other instances, records 
indicated an astonishing fifty times more soil pollution in more or less the entire Copper belt.113 
                                                          
109 ibid 
110 Ibid SGAB and others, 2005.   
111 Czech Geological Survey. (2007). Environmental-Geochemical Atlas of the Central-Northern Part of the Copper Belt Province 
of Zambia. A project of the Development Cooperation Programme of the Czech Republic. 
112 Ibid. 26 
113 Czech Geological Survey. 2007. Environmental-Geochemical Atlas of the Central-Northern Part of the Copperbelt Province of 
Zambia. A project of the Development Cooperation Programme of the Czech Republic. 
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                    Figure 8. High Soil Absorption of Pollution on the Copper belt 
 
 
                          CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
5.0 Introduction 
This final chapter examines and discusses the results of the study on the effects of copper 
production on the environment and local communities in Zambia, and how the environment has 
changed because of mining and smelting operations. Using a political ecological framework with 
that of a multiple scale analysis, the discussion is based on the local impact on the Copper Belt 
Province. 
5.1 The Impact of Large Scale Copper Production on the Environment 
Zambia is home to one of the world’s largest sources of copper ore, geographically located on 
the border between Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in a region known as 
the Copper Belt Province. Since independence, the mining industry has been the economic 
backbone of Zambia’s development, with the mining sector contributing significantly to the 
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nation’s overall growth. From the country’s mining sector, the Zambian Government gathers 
revenue in the form of mineral royalties, payments, payroll and corporate taxes and other 
peripheral benefits that are used for developmental schemes and public service provision in the 
health, education, agriculture, infrastructural development, manufacturing and construction 
sectors. Furthermore, the industry is one of the principal employers in the country, directly and 
indirectly providing employment opportunities to thousands of people across the nation, given 
the huge foreign investments that have invigorated Zambia’s mining sector since the beginning 
of this century. In 2015 alone, Zambia produced 710,860 metric tons of copper, generating 
foreign revenue worth over US$6.9 billion.114 Heavy investments in the sector by foreign mining 
companies have been made following the privatization of the copper mines from the year 2000, 
after three decades of nationalization and lack of re-investment. Since then, encouraged by a 
revival in copper prices, mining MNCs have invested over US$10 billion in the sector, 
revitalizing Zambia’s copper production to historically high levels. Copper production increased 
from about 250,000 tons in 2000 to over 750,000 tons in 2013.115 
However, taking a wider view of these developments, while they suggest great news for Zambia 
from its mining sector, the reality is that most Zambians continue to incur negative social, health 
and environmental impacts from its operations. The “resource curse” of copper production is 
evident, especially by citizens who live in the Copper Belt Province. The acceptance over the last 
quarter of a century of neoliberal economic policies, centered on private sector-led growth and 
an open economy that is welcoming to foreign direct investment, called for a complete 
reorientation of the laws and policies of the nation. These, inter alia, conferred generous tax 
breaks and incentive packages for the mining companies which were detrimental to the nation’s 
                                                          
114 Ministry of Finance, Government of the Republic of Zambia, 2015 Economic Report, p.7 and p.48 
115 "International Monetary Fund: Zambia, Selected Issues." May 06, 2015. Accessed December 12, 2016. 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15153.pdf. IMF Country Report No. 15/153 
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public finances and hence public service delivery and development outcomes. For instance, in 
the period of 2000–07, on average, the mining industry paid less than 0.1% of GDP to the 
government by way of taxes and royalties, although accounting for about 6.2% of GDP. This 
truncated contribution was due to the generous mining tax regime as well as transfer pricing and 
other profit shifting arrangements engaged in by the MNCs to reduce their exposure to Zambian 
tax obligations. 
All of Zambia’s copper mines are now owned by multinational mining companies who are 
intricately enmeshed in the global capitalist system and whose overall objective is to maximize 
profits and financial returns for their shareholders. From a political ecology viewpoint, the 
conduct of mining activities on the Copper belt is inescapably driven by the precepts of a 
neoliberal economic paradigm and the dictates of the international financial/capitalist system.  
In line with the above viewpoint, the ability to wield political influence plays a crucial role in 
what measures are taken to promote environmental conservation and the efficacy of these 
measures.116 Politics includes the ability to secure and use power to attain one’s advantage and 
objectives in struggle with others having alternative goals and values. Authority in a political 
ecology context can be understood as “the skill of a performer to regulate their own contact with 
the environment and the interface of other performers with the environment”117  
A prominent result from the multiple scale analysis is how the national government has radically 
impacted land use by altering who has access to what land in Zambia, through the enactment of 
various legislation and policies. The nature of land tenure arrangements as understood in the 
                                                          
116 Per Bryant and Bailey, 1998:39 
117 Ibid. 
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minerals and mining legislation of Zambia gives the State the right to lands with minerals.118 Per 
Turner,119 “Two related classes of value can be made from land and land capitals. First, the value 
characterized by the floods of advantages that they make for those holding rights to them, and 
the price that market forces assign to them.”  
The government possesses the authority to regulate and make choices on land use and land 
ownership in discussion with other performers (i.e. mining companies, local communities, 
traditional rulers and officeholders) with respect to mining rights. The exercise of power by 
actors is highly likely to create change in the decisions and policies that Government makes.120 
Thus, the enormous power which the mining MNCs have arising from their ability to mobilize 
large capital resources and create employment for thousands of Zambians confers on them the 
ability to interact with Government in ways that favours their interests even at the expense of 
wider development objectives. Such unequal power between parties is used to create and sustain 
unfair relations between them, resulting in struggle and conflict owing to dissatisfaction over the 
sharing of the proceeds of the nation’s mineral wealth and the lack of effective environmental 
management when it conflicts with the commercial interests of the MNCs and their ability to 
dominate in the debate over the control of resources.121 In Zambia, particularly with mining 
developments on the Copper belt, mining operations by the MNCs act as an instrument for the 
government to exploit for its own political plans, as they assert the right to bestow mining 
franchises to particular mining companies in return for relatively paltry taxes and royalties. 
                                                          
118 All land in Zambia is vested in the president, in trust for the people of Zambia, under the Land Act of 1995, Chapter 184 of 
the Laws of Zambia. 
119 Turner, S.D. (1995) ‘Common Property Resources and the Rural Poor in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Roma: International Fund for 
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120  See Byrant and Bailey, 1997 at P:39 
121 Bebbington, A., Hinojosa, L., Bebbington, H.D., Burneo, M.L. and Ximena, W. (2008) “Contention and Ambiguity: Mining and 
the Possibilities of Development,” Development and Change, Vol. 39, No. 6: 887-914. Blackwell Publishing. P 890 
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Applying the multiple scale analysis to mining on the Copper belt (see Figure 10), it was 
observed that stronger actors in the copper mining sector, such as government leaders, mining 
companies, the IMF and World Bank, are wielding their disproportionate power to achieve their 
own agendas at the expense of the environment and weaker performers—especially local 
communities in the mining towns and the surrounding areas. Each interest group uses its power 
derived from the financial resources, tools and skills it can muster, to maneuver and advance 
their own agenda. For instance, mining companies use their ability to mobilize enormous capital 
amounts to obtain access to the nation’s copper ores while Government supplies them with 
generous inducement packages to do so.  
Developing countries like Zambia, who want to sustain economic growth and provide 
employment for their people, are led to believe that they must offer attractive incentives in what 
has been termed a “race to the bottom.” These incentives often include turning a blind eye to 
negative environmental impacts or agreeing to reduce their liability for doing so, as these 
countries must also operate and survive in a global economy driven by private profits and highly 
mobile capital flows.  
Further, the exploitation of a country’s natural resources by foreign MNCs is inevitably a key 
source of environmental and societal struggle. This is particularly the case where local people are 
discontented over the arrangements put in place to determine how the income and wealth 
produced by the exploitation of their natural resources is distributed but are the ones who face 
the brunt of all the negative environmental impacts. They are left them with little material benefit 
but bear the greatest environmental costs.122 
 
                                                          
122  See Bebbington , (2008). P. 890 
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                                                   Figure 9: Interest Associations in Copper Mining in Zambia 
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5.2. Mining Pollution Impacts at the Local Level 
The findings of this research corroborate the argument that mining operations on the Copper belt 
province in Zambia have resulted in an increase in the number and scale of environmental and 
human quality of life problems.123 In the present study, specific negative impacts of mining 
processes upon the environment were recognized in the investigation that included; substantial 
and health threatening land, water and air contamination. 
On the matter of land deprivation, vast areas of land have been cleared to accommodate open 
cast/surface mining and to store (especially in the form of tailing dumps and dams) the waste 
material from ore extraction and processing activities. In the case of soil fertility and water 
quality, lands intended for farming and pastoral activities have likewise been ruined through a 
poisoning of soils and water sources because of the mining activities negatively affecting local 
community livelihoods based on agriculture. Soil pollution remains a huge issue, given that land 
is a stationary asset. Hence land pollution contaminants remain in the same area polluting the 
surrounding ecosystems thus creating an imbalance, deforestation and the obliteration of wildlife 
environments because of large scale copper mining. Copper mining on the Copper belt involves 
mineral exploitation that comprises of underground pits and the demolition of rocks using 
ammunition which could create extreme damage to the environment and release toxic dust into 
the atmosphere. Further damage and removal of the vegetative cover has contributed to a large 
areas of soil erosion and extreme run off water and flash flooding during the rainy season.124 
Air pollution is another environmental problem prevalent in the Copper belt mining areas, arising 
from the use of explosives in quarrying and drilling activities as well as the release of toxic gases 
– principally sulfur dioxide – from the copper smelters. These actions have created highly 
                                                          
123 See SGAB and others, 2005. 
124 Chifungula, Anna O. "Management of environmental degradation caused by mining activities in Zambia." (2014).  
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contaminated atmospheric air in the areas surrounding mining activities, severely jeopardizing 
human health and well-being. The use of explosives also creates dangers to structures and there 
are reported cases of mining operations at Konkola Copper Mines in Kitwe using piercing and 
blasting that had caused cracks and the failure of structures built in the surrounding 
community.125 
Contamination of surface and groundwater resources in the research area was a clear outcome of 
the mining operations undertaken. The Mushishima, Muntimpa and Chingola streams and the 
mighty Kafue river itself are all contaminated. These water courses are stained a cloudy brown 
color as their waters mix with chemicals originating from effluent spilled by Konkola Copper 
Mines (KCM) that contains suspended solids (containing poisonous substances such as mercury 
and sulphur).126 The result of pollution of water sources has endangered human life and 
wellbeing as well as that of pastoral animals and wildlife.  The outcome of this water pollution 
has affected both the economic livelihoods and the domestic households of people, especially 
those residing in rural areas adjacent to, or downstream from, mining areas without access to 
running treated pipe water, that are left to travel long distances in search of potable water for 
themselves and their animals. 127 
 
 
 
5.3 Conclusion and Recommendations 
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There is a growing necessity for the Government of Zambia to harmonize mining and ecological 
legislation and strategies to promote both economic growth and to safeguard social-ecological 
development. However, to get to that point, the following recommendations are proposed. 
The impacts of copper mining upon the environment in Zambia are very conspicuous. Although 
there have been some achievements d thus far, a lot remains to be done to make more substantial 
progress. Future development policies and plans ought to promote economic growth but also 
strengthen the capacity to protect the environment by stakeholders - including the Government 
administration - to enhance the efficacy of ecological conservation efforts, ensure strict 
compliance with environmental standards and enforce criminal penalties against mining 
proprietors who are found to be in breach of the law.  
Secondly, there is a need to strengthen the management of ecological reporting systems, and to 
devise effective environment impact assessment tools. The existing administration and 
management procedures fall short, and there are numerous discrepancies in the environmental 
management systems (EMS) under the supervision of ZEMA used for shadowing the sector. This 
will allow regulators to consistently uphold national standards to curb pollution that terminates 
livelihoods and destroys the environment in mining areas. Without effective monitoring systems, 
violations will continue to be made with relative impunity by mining companies. Thus, ZEMA 
should be able to effectively monitor not only the mining proprietors’ arrangements and 
procedures for mitigating the negative environmental impacts of their activities but also ensure 
that these procedures are indeed effective in reducing to a minimum the environmental footprint 
of the operations. Furthermore, there is a need for better technical and geoscientific data, and 
training for personnel on environmental management that is relevant and practical for everyday 
work and application. Such practical trainings should focus on specific topics, i.e. waste 
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management spill prevention and monitoring, reporting and evaluation, as well as emergency 
evacuation procedures. 
This investigation was based on one theoretical concept, that copper production combined with 
the profit seeking / cost minimizing behavior of multinational mining companies who operate in 
the global capitalist system - directly affect the specific forms of Zambian mining activities 
which in turn has significant negative environmental and social impact, resulting in 
environmental degradation at the local level. This theory has been tested in line with the findings 
presented through economic and environmental indicators and applied in the current analysis. 
The current legal requirements are not sufficient to ensure ethical mining practices when 
discharging waste from extraction or smelting processes, resulting in the negative social and 
environmental impacts associated with copper mining. 
This leads to the conclusion that there is an urgent need to enhance and implement strategies, 
systems and legislation which allows for greater transparency in the mining industry about the 
procedures used to mitigate negative environmental impacts, the quantitative and qualitative 
results of these procedures and the steps required to be taken as soon as compliance levels wane.  
The full involvement of the government, local communities, non-governmental organizations, 
the mining companies themselves, and other stakeholders engaged in the mining industry, is 
needed to comprehensively address the social-environmental impacts of mining operations. This 
should be done by designing and implementing holistic and practical environmental protection 
legislation that is backed by institutions and resources that can effectively implement this 
legislation to attain genuine mitigation of all undesirable environmental and ecological outcomes 
of mining activity at the local (and wider) levels. 
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